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Abstract Online personal health record (PHR) is more
inclined to shift data storage and search operations to cloud
server so as to enjoy the elastic resources and lessen com-
putational burden in cloud storage. As multiple patients’
data is always stored in the cloud server simultaneously,
it is a challenge to guarantee the confidentiality of PHR
data and allow data users to search encrypted data in
an efficient and privacy-preserving way. To this end, we
design a secure cryptographic primitive called as attribute-
based multi-keyword search over encrypted personal health
records in multi-owner setting to support both fine-grained
access control and multi-keyword search via Ciphertext-
Policy Attribute-Based Encryption. Formal security analysis
proves our scheme is selectively secure against chosen-
keyword attack. As a further contribution, we conduct
empirical experiments over real-world dataset to show its
feasibility and practicality in a broad range of actual scenar-
ios without incurring additional computational burden.
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Introduction
With the development of cloud storage, considerable
amount of individuals and enterprises are motivated to
ease heavy computation and management burden in a cost-
effective way through outsourcing their records to cloud
service providers (CSP). While data security and privacy
concerns remain significant barriers to the adoption of
cloud storage [1, 2] as CSP is always considered to be
a honest-but-curious [3] entity. Encrypting is considered
as a simple and efficient solution to guarantee the data
confidentiality, but it also makes search over encrypted
data extremely difficult, especially for the encrypted per-
sonal health record (PHR) system. Therefore, exploring
efficient searchable encryption (SE) techniques [4, 5] which
enable cloud clients to securely search through keywords
and selectively retrieve files of interest over encrypted data
has recently drawn a significant amount of interest in both
industry and academia fields. As SE technique enables data
users to conduct search operation over encrypted data with-
out any loss of data confidentiality, a variety of follow-up
work has been proposed to meet various application require-
ments, such as conjunctive keyword search, fuzzy keyword
search and ranked keyword search. However, one desires
such protocols which provide secure search yet still enable
data owner to impose enforcement of access control over
encrypted data in multi-user setting. To tackle this problem,
the state-of-the-art attribute-based encryption (ABE) tech-
nique [6–8] will be adopted to achieve fine-grained access
control.
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Consider a Personal Health Record (PHR) system [9],
patients lose physical control over their data through out-
sourcing records to CSP. Moreover, encryption-before-
outsourcing mechanism makes it is challenging to achieve
fine-grained access control over encrypted data, especially
for the existence of multiple patients (In here, we call the
scenario as multi-owner setting). Thus, enforcing the data
owner’s access control over outsourced data is of prime
importance in multi-owner setting. Aside from enabling
to guarantee that only authorized users can browse the
encrypted records, this system should also support retriev-
ing corresponding encrypted records that contain given
query keywords. And the SE schemes supporting single-
keyword search inevitably return many irrelevant results
and incur great computational burden when multiple key-
words have to be matched simultaneously. To enable cloud
clients to quickly search the most relevant records, it is cru-
cial for SE schemes to support multi-keyword search so as
to improve search result accuracy as well as user search
experience.
To the best of our knowledge, the multi-owner set-
ting mentioned in previous schemes [8, 9] actually dis-
cusses about data owners’ updating (i.e., the enrollment
or revocation). Along these directions, in this paper we
organically integrate SE with Ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-
ABE) scheme [7] and devise a new cryptographic primitive,
namely m2-ABKS (Attribute-Basedmulti-Keyword Search
over encrypted personal health records in multi-user set-
ting). Our scheme can achieve fine-grained access control
over encrypted data and support multi-keyword query in
multi-owner setting simultaneously. Formal security anal-
ysis proves that m2-ABKS scheme is selectively secure
against chosen-keyword attack and achieves the keyword
secrecy. We also make theoretical computation complex-
ity analysis and conduct empirical experiments to show
its feasibility in practice. The experimental results indicate
that the actual performance evaluation is in accord with
the theoretical study of asymptotic computation complex-
ity. Thus, our scheme can admit a broad of applications
in practice without incurring heavy computational burden.
The main contributions of this work can be summarized as
follows:
– Supporting real multi-owner setting. m2-ABKS
scheme allows multiple patients to enhance access con-
trol over encrypted records through utilizing CP-ABE
scheme.
– Supporting multi-keyword query. Our scheme allows
data users to perform multi-keyword search query
rather than single keyword query so as to save band-
width and computation resources.
– Resisting chosen-keyword attack and ensuring key-
word secrecy. Security analysis formally proves that
our scheme is selectively secure against the chosen-
keyword attack, and it can also ensure keyword secrecy.
Additionally, collusion attack and unauthorized access
can be effectively prohibited.
– Efficiency and feasibility. The experimental results
over real-world dataset show that our scheme is effi-
cient and feasible in practical applications.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows. We first review some cryptographic preliminaries
used in our work in Section “Preliminaries”, followed
by Section “Problem formulation” which introduces the
system model, algorithm definition and security models.
The specific construction of our scheme is presented in
Section “Concrete construction of m2-ABKS”. Security
and performance analysis of m2-ABKS scheme are pre-
sented in Section “Security and performance analysis”.
Then Section “Related work” presents the related work
associated with our scheme. Finally, the concluding remark
of this whole paper is summarized in Section “Conclusion”.
Preliminaries
In this part, we first briefly review some cryptographic
background associated with our scheme.
Definition 1 (Bilinear Group and Pairings) Let G1,G2
be two (multiplicative) cyclic groups of prime order q, g be
a generator of group G1 and e be the bilinear map G1 ×
G1 → G2 with following properties:
– Bilinearity: Given four random elements a, b ∈ G1, x
, y ∈ Zq , we get e(ax, by) = e(ay, bx) = e(a, b)xy .
– Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) = 1.
– Computability: There exits an efficient algorithm to
computer e(g, g).
Definition 2 (Access Tree T ) Let T be a tree describing
an access structure, each non-leaf node can be treated as a
threshold gate and described by its children and threshold
value. Let numx be the number of children for node x and kx
be the threshold value, where 0 < kx ≤ numx . When kx =
1, the threshold gate is an OR gate, and when kx = numx , it
is an AND gate. Each leaf node is described by an attribute
and its threshold value kx = 1. The parent of node x is
denoted as parent (x), and att (x) represents the attribute
associated with each leaf node x. In addition, for each node
y, who is a child of x (i.e., parent (y) = x), we assign
a number from {1, 2, . . . , numx} as its index, denoted by
index(y). The index values are uniquely assigned to nodes
in the access structure for a given key in an arbitrary manner.
That is, ∀y = y′, if parent (y) = parent (y′), index(y) =
index(y′).
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Let the root node of T be r and Tx be the subtree of
T rooted at the node x. If an attribute set γ satisfies the
access tree Tx , then Tx(γ ) = 1. In particular, Tx(γ ) can
be recursively computed as follows. If x is a non-leaf node,
compute Tx′(γ ) for all children x′ of node x. Tx(γ ) returns
1 if and only if at least kx children return 1. If x is a leaf
node, then Tx(γ ) returns 1 if and only if att (x) ∈ γ .
Problem formulation
System and threat models
We consider a cryptographic cloud storage system (e.g.,
PHR) supporting both information retrieval and fine-grained
access control over encrypted personal data files (e.g.,
health records). In such system, there exist multiple data
owners (e.g., patients) and multiple data users. Data own-
ers can create, manage and modify their files, data users
(e.g., doctor, healthcare provider, researcher) can access
these sensitive files with authorizations from certain patient.
There are four entities involved in the system framework,
namely data owner (DO), data user (DU), cloud server
provider (CSP) and third trusted server (TTS) in Fig. 1. To
enjoy the elastic resources and reduce the operational cost, it
is attractive for DO to outsource data storage and retrieval to
CSP, where encryption-before-outsourcing solution makes
this a challenging issue to enable fine-grained access control
over encrypted data in a scalable and efficient way. Based
on that, m2-ABKS scheme works as follows:
(1) DO first extracts keyword set from each health record
and builds index with specified access policy by lever-
aging CP-ABE, then sends ciphertext to CSP.
Fig. 1 System model of m2-ABKS scheme
(2) DU gains the secret key generated through submitting
his attribute set to TTS, then he generates the trap-
door of interested keyword set and submits it as well
as attribute set to CSP.
(3) After gaining the trapdoor and attribute set, CSP first
verifies the legitimacy of DU, then matches the trap-
door with the indexes and returns relevant records to DU.
(4) Only when the attribute set satisfies the specified
access policy, DU can gain the relevant search results.
For the fully-trusted TTS, it is assumed to be uncom-
promisable by any attack. While for CSP, we assume that
it is honest-but-curious like many previous schemes. That
is, it genuinely follows the specified protocols to execute
search operations, but it may be curious to deduce valuable
information through analyzing the statistic of outsourced
data, which results in severe security breaches on the con-
fidentiality of encrypted raw data. To be more convenient,
DOs intend to erase the heavy burden of large scale data
management in a cost-effective manner with the help of
CSP. However, they must enforce the access control over
encrypted data to avoid data privacy leakage when exploit-
ing the CSP’s huge computing power. Notice that the record
encryption is beyond the scope of our discussion.
Algorithm definition
Let U = {1, 2, . . . , n} be an attribute set for the access
policy, W = {w1, . . . , wm} be keyword dictionary, D =
{d1, . . . , dp} be the record set, the tuple (G1,G1, q, g, e)
be the bilinear map parameters, and (W,G) be the key-
word space and access structure space, respectively. And our
scheme is a tuple (Setup,KeyGen,Enc,Trap,Serch) of five
polynomial-time algorithms shown as follows:
(1) (mk, pk, s) ← Setup(k,U): Take the security param-
eter k, attribute set U as input, this algorithm outputs
the public key pk, master key mk and a symmetrical
secret key s, where mk is owned by TTS.
(2) sk ← KeyGen(mk, S, T ): TTS runs this algorithm to
generate the private key sk for DU who has an attribute
set S according to the access tree T .
(3) (C, I ) ← Enc(pk, s,W, f,P): DO performs this
algorithm to generate ciphertext C and index I accord-
ing to specified access structure P for his records,
where P can be used to specify the DUs who are
authorized to access the sensitive information.
(4) T ← Trap(sk,W ′): DU runs this algorithm to output
the trapdoor T for keyword set W ′, then he sends it to
CSP.
(5) {0, 1} ← Search(T , I, C): After gaining the trapdoor
T , CSP first matches it with the index I , then it returns
the relevant search results C to DU, where “1” denotes
that the algorithm returns correct results, “0” means ⊥.
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Security models
The adversary is allowed to submit search tokens except
those corresponding to the keyword set in the chal-
lenge phase, while he learns nothing beyond search
results. We formalize the security models through selec-
tively chosen-keyword game and keyword secrecy game,
respectively. Specifically, if there exists no probabilis-
tic polynomial-time adversary A who can deduce any
plaintext information, then we consider a semantic secu-
rity against chosen-keyword attack. The security of our
scheme can be defined by two asymptotically equiva-
lent security games (i.e. indistinguishability of ciphertext
from ciphertext chosen-keyword attack, indistinguishabil-
ity of ciphertext from random chosen-keyword attack.)
except for Challenge phase [10]. Our scheme is selectively
secure based on the indistinguishability of ciphertext from
ciphertext chosen-keyword attack. We formally introduce
the selectively chosen-keyword attack (SCKA) game as
follows.
(1) Setup: Given the security parameter k, the challenger
C runs the KeyGen(mk, S, T ) algorithm to output the
secret key sk, while the adversaryA just has the public
key pk, where the mk is owned by C.
(2) Phase 1:A adaptively queries a series of keyword sets
W1, ...,Wt to Trap oracle as follows:
– Trap(sk,W). C runs Trap(sk,Wi) algorithm to
generate the trapdoor TWi , then responds it to A.
(3) Challenge: A first selects two target keyword set
(W0,W1) and sends them to C, then C randomly
chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1}, while it is required that
W0 and W1 cannot be issued in the Trap oracle.
Finally C sets Ib = Enc(pk,Wb,P) and sends it to
A.
(4) Phase 2: A issues keyword sets Wt+1, ...,Wτ to Trap
oracle as follows:
– Trap(sk,Wi = W0,W1). C first runs Trap(sk,Wi)
algorithm to generate the trapdoor TWi , then C
sends it to A.
(5) Guess:A outputs a guess b′ ∈ {0, 1}. It wins the game
if b = b′.
The A’s advantage in breaking our scheme is denoted as
AdvSCKA
m2−ABKS,A(1
k) = |Pr[b = b′] − 12 |.
To protect the keyword security, our scheme must ensure
that the malicious adversaries deduce nothing from keyword
ciphertext or search token. Specifically, if there exists no
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A who can learn
the keyword plaintext from keyword ciphertext or search
token, the keyword secrecy can be guaranteed. The keyword
secrecy game is shown as follows:
(1) Setup: Given a security parameter k, the challenger C
runs Setup(k,U) algorithm to generate the public key
pk and master key mk.
(2) Phase 1: The adversary A issues the following algo-
rithms for polynomially many times.
– KeyGen: C sends corresponding secret key sk to
A and adds the queried keyword set in the list
lKeyGen.
– Trap: Given the secret key sk and keyword set W ,
C generates the trapdoor T and returns it to A.
(3) Challenge:A first chooses a challenging secret key sk
and gives it to C, then C chooses keyword set W ′ from
message space and runs Enc algorithm, finally C sends
the index I to A.
(4) Guess: After issuing τ distinct keyword set,A outputs
a keyword set W ′ and wins the keyword secrecy game
if W = W ′.
Our scheme can achieve keyword secrecy if A’s prob-
ability in breaking the keyword secrecy game is at most
1
|W |−τ + , where τ denotes the number of keyword sets, 
is an negligible probability in security parameter k and W
is the keyword space.
Concrete construction of m2-ABKS
Our scheme allows certain DO to outsource encrypted
indexes and ask CSP to perform keyword query. Specifi-
cally, each DO (e.g., patient) generates the index for his
data file (e.g., health record) with specified access policy
which is expressed by a series of ‘AND’ and ‘OR’ gates,
such as the access structure shown in Fig. 2. Afterwards,
certain DO delegates the keyword search capability to DUs
(e.g., healthcare providers, a doctor in certain hospital)
according to his specified access policy. Only the authorized
DUs whose attributes satisfy the access policy can retrieve
encrypted records. Otherwise, the illegal DUs have no cor-
responding secret keys to generate search token. Next, we
give the concrete construction of our scheme and show its
correctness, respectively.
Fig. 2 An example of access policy
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Scheme details
In this part, we first denote the Lagrange Coefficient as

i,ω(x) = j∈ω,j =i x−ji−j , where i ∈ Zq , ω is a set of ele-
ments in Zq . Besides, we introduce some notations (shown
in Table 1) used in our scheme before presenting the specific
construction of m2-ABKS scheme as follows:
System setup Given the secure parameter k and the
bilinear map parameters (G1,G2, q, g, e), TTS first calls
(mk, pk, s) ← Setup(k,U) algorithm to generate the pub-
lic key pk, master key mk and a symmetrical secret key
s, then it selects two collision-resistant hash functions h1 :
{0, 1}∗ → G1, h2 : {0, 1}∗ → Zq . Besides, it randomly
selects elements α, β, γ ∈ Zq and computes X = gα, Y =
gβ, Z = gγ . Finally, it sets the public key pk and master
key msk as follows:
pk = (G1,G2, q, g, e, h1, h2, X, Y, Z),
mk = (α, β, γ ).
Key generation Given a set of attributes S, TTS calls sk ←
KeyGen(mk, S, T ) algorithm to generate the private key sk
for authorized DU. It first chooses a random element r ∈
Zq , then selects random rj ∈ Zq for each attribute j ∈ S,
finally outputs secret key sk through the following equation.
sk = (π = g(αγ−r)/β, {λj = grh1(j)rj , μj = grj }j∈S).
Index generation Before outsourcing ciphertext to CSP,
DO needs to call (C, I ) ← Enc(pk, s,W,D,P) algorithm
to generate index and encrypt record set. He first extracts
keyword set Wd = {wI1 , . . . , wIj , . . . , wIm} from certain
record d ∈ D and selects random elements r1, r2 ∈ Zq ,
where Ij = 1 represents that the j − th keyword in W is
included in d, otherwise, it is not included in the record.
Table 1 Notation definitions
Symbols Descriptions
T Access stucture
U = {1, ..., n} Attribute set for T
W = {w1, ..., wm} Keyword set
W ′ = {w′1, ..., w′t } Submitted keyword set
D = {d1, ..., dp} Record set
S DU’s attribute set
Wd = {wI1 , ..., wIm } Keywords included in d
Ij |j ∈ {1, ..., m} j -th keyword in W
I ′i |i ∈ {1, ..., t} i-th submitted keyword in W
I Index for record d
C Ciphertext for record d
T Trapdoor for keywords W ′
Then he chooses a polynomial qx for each node x of T in
the following way, which starts from the root node r in a
top-down manner. For each node x, set the degree dx of
polynomial qx as dx = kx − 1, where kx is the threshold
value of x. Starting with the root node r , this algorithm sets
qr(0) = r2, then it randomly chooses dr other points of
polynomial qr to define it completely. For other node x, this
algorithm sets qx(0) = qparent (x)(index(x)) and randomly
chooses dx other points to completely define polynomial
qx . Mark the leaf node set of T as ln and compute CT as
follows:
{δi = Xr1h2(wi)}i∈{1,...,m};
E0 = Xr2 , E1 = Y r2 , E2 = Zr1 , C = Encs(d);
{δy = gqy(0), θy = h1(att (y))qy(0)}y∈ln.
Finally he sends the index and encrypted record CT =
(C, I ) to CSP, where I = {{δi}, {δy, θy}, E0, E1, E2}.
While the record encryption C = Encs(d) is beyond the
scope of our discussion.
Trapdoor generation Given the queried keyword setW ′ =
{w′1, . . . , w′t }, the T ← Trap(sk,W ′, I ′1, ..., I ′t ) algorithm
is called by DU to generate the trapdoor T . He first
selects a random element s ∈ Zq and computes T1 =
ti=1g
sαh2(w
′
i ), T2 = gsγ , T3 = πs . Then he com-
putes λ′j = λsj , μ′j = μsj for each attribute j ∈ S
and sets the trapdoor of submitted keyword set as T =
(S, T1, T2, T3, {λ′j , μ′j }j∈S). Finally he sends T to CSP.
Notably, {I ′1, . . . , I ′t } represent the positions of interested
keywords in dictionary.
Ciphertext search After verifying that the attribute set S
satisfies the specified access policy T , CSP calls {0, 1} ←
Search(T , I, C) algorithm to return the relevant results with
the following steps:
Step 1: If x is a leaf node, it sets j ′ = att (x). And if
j ′ ∈ S, it computes Dx through the following equations.
Otherwise, Dx = ⊥.
Dx = e(λ′j ′ , δx)/e(μ′j ′ , θx) = e(g, g)rsqx(0).
Step 2: If x is a non-leaf node, it calls the recursive algo-
rithm to compute Dx . For all children x′ of node x,
it computes Dx′ . Let ωx be an arbitrary kx-size set of
children x′ such that Dx′ = ⊥. If there is no such
set, then Dx′ = ⊥. Otherwise, it computes Dx =
x′∈ωxD

i,ω′x (0)
x′ = e(g, g)rsqx(0), where i = index(x′),
ω′x = {index(x′) : x′ ∈ ωx}.
Step 3: Then CSP verifies whether (1) holds. If yes, CSP
returns relevant results to DU; otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Notably, Dr = e(g, g)rsqr (0) = e(g, g)rsr2 .
e(ti=1δiE0, T2) = e(E2, T1)Dre(E1, T3). (1)
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Remark 1 In practical systems (such as PHR), every
patient specifies his own access policy. Therefore, even
though some unauthorized DUs have the rights to gen-
erate search tokens, they cannot gain relevant records as
the submitted attributes do not match the access structure.
Besides, the search token is obfuscated by a random element
s ∈ Zq such that the malicious CSP is unable to distin-
guish two trapdoors generated from the same keyword set.
Therefore, the record confidentiality and trapdoor unlinka-
bility can be achieved in our scheme. Meanwhile, as a large
number of computational operations (e.g., the most time-
consuming pairing operation) are outsourced to CSP, the
computational burden of resource-limited cloud clients is
minimized. In conclusion, our scheme is efficient and feasi-
ble in actual scenarios due to its low computational cost and
data confidentiality protection.
Correctness analysis
To show that Eq. 1 is correct, we suppose the attribute set of
DU matches the specified access policy, and the submitted
keyword set, W ′ ⊆ W , is included in the record, then the
correctness of the scheme can be verified as follows:
First, we have
e(E2, T1) = e(g, g)sαγ r1ti=1h2(w′i )
e(E1, T3) = e(g, g)sαγ r2−rsr2
Dr = e(g, g)rsr2
Then, we can get
e(E2, T1)Dre(E1, T3) = e(g, g)sαγ (r2+r1ti=1h2(w′i ))
And we know
e(ti=1δiE0, T2) = e(gr2α+r1α
t
i=1h2(w′i ), gsγ )
= e(g, g)sαγ (r2+r1ti=1h2(w′i ))
Finally, we verify that Eq. 1 holds:
e(ti=1δiE0, T2) = e(E2, T1)Dre(E1, T3).
Security and performance analysis
In this section, for security, we formally prove the secu-
rity properties of our scheme and show it coincides with
secure requirements. For actual performance evaluation, we
first compare it with other analogous schemes in terms of
theoretical performance (in here, it means computational
1m2-ABKS also supports user revocation (UR), the majority of exist-
ing UR schemes can be attached to m2-ABKS without any variation.
As it is beyond the focus of this paper, we will not discuss the detail of
UR in m2-ABKS due to space limit.
complexity). Furthermore, we conduct empirical study over
a real-world dataset to analyze its efficiency and feasibility
in practice.
Security analysis
Aiming to proof the security of our scheme, we first ana-
lyze its security properties, and then give the formal security
proof. Not only the encrypted records are confidential to
non-authorized DUs, but also our scheme can resist col-
lusion attack. For example, Alice has the secret key cor-
responding to attributes ‘A’ and ‘B’, Bob has the secret
key associated with attributes ‘B’ and ‘C’, while they can-
not gain the secret key related to attributes ‘A’ and ‘C’
through colluding due to the random element rj ∈ Zq .
In our scheme, plaintext keywords are encrypted to cipher-
text based on access policy before outsourced to vicious
CSP so that the sensitive information cannot be gained from
ciphertext.
Only the authorized DUs whose attributes match the
specified access policy, can receive the relevant encrypted
records. Since each DU is distributed a unique secret
key sk, the malicious CSP or adversary cannot forge
legal search token. Moreover, vicious CSP or adversary
cannot deduce keyword set from search token T =
(S, T1, T2, T3, {λ′j , μ′j }j∈S). Therefore, our scheme can
achieve keyword confidentiality as the search token is
obscured by random elements.
To ensure the scheme secure, malicious CSP must not
infer any valuable information except the search results. If
there exists no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A
who can deduce any plaintext information, then our scheme
is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack. The
security of m2-ABKS scheme can be ensured by the follow-
ing theorems which have the same proofs as the literature [7,
11]. Unfortunately, the proof of Theorem 1 is based on
the generic bilinear group model [12] and the random ora-
cle [13]. Therefore, the security of our scheme may be
reduced for the sake of performance and functionality when
compared with more secure CP-ABE scheme [14].
Theorem 1 m2-ABKS scheme is selectively secure against
chosen-keyword attack based on the generic bilinear group
model. Where the hash function h1 is modeled as a random
oracle and h2 is defined as a one-way hash function.
Proof Let hash function h1 be modeled as a random oracle
and h2 be one-way hash function, then we prove that scheme
is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack in the
random oracle.
In SCKA game, adversary A attempts to distinguish
Xr1h2(w0) from Xr1h2(w1). Given a random element ν ∈ Zq ,
the probability of distinguishing Xr1h2(w0) from gν is the
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same as that of distinguishing Xr1h2(w1) from gν , where
X = gα . The SCKA game is shown as follows:
Setup: The challenger C first selects α, β, γ ∈ Zq and
generates public parameters (e, g, q, gα, gβ, gγ ) for A.
Then A chooses an access policy T ′ and sends it to C.
h1(j) is simulated as follows: if attribute j has been
queried before, C selects a random element r ′j ∈ Zq and
adds (j, r ′j ) toOh1 and returns gr
′
j ; otherwise, C retrieves
r ′j from Oh1 and returns gr
′
j .
Phase 1: A queries OKeyGen and OT rap as follows:
– OKeyGen(S,mk, T ). C first chooses r∗ ∈ Zq and
computes π = gαγ−r∗/β , then C selects random ele-
ment r∗j ∈ Zq and computes λj = gr
∗
h1(j)
r∗j , μj =
g
r∗j for each attribute j ∈ S. Finally, C returns the
tuple (S, π, {λj , μj }j∈S).
– OT rap(sk,W ∗). C first issues OKeyGen(mk, S)
oracle in order to gain secret key sk =
(S, π, {λj , μj }j∈S), then C selects random element
s ∈ Zq and computes T1 = ti=1gsαh2(wi), T2 =
gsγ , T3 = πs . If the attribute set S satisfies the
access policy, C addsW ∗ to the keyword set List LW .
Challenge Phase: Given keyword sets W0,W1 which do
not belong to keyword set List LW , C selects ran-
dom elements r1, r2 ∈ Zq and computes secret shares
of r2 for each leaf node in tree T ′. Then C outputs
a random bit b∗ ∈ {0, 1}, if b∗ = 0, it outputs
{δi = gνh2(wi)}i∈{1,...,m}, E0 = Xr2 , E1 = Y r2 , E2 =
Zr1 , {δy = gqy(0), θy = h1(att (y))qy(0)}y∈ln. Otherwise,
C returns {δi = Xr1h2(wi)}i∈{1,...,m}, E0 = Xr2 , E1 =
Y r2 , E2 = Zr1 , {δy = gqy(0), θy = h1(att (y))qy(0)}y∈ln,
where att (y) = j ∈ S.
Phase 2: This phase has the same procedures as in SCKA
game.
We notice that if A can construct Xξr1h2(wi) for some gξ
included in the oracle outputs he has already queried, then
A is able to distinguish Xr1h2(wi) from gν , where X = gα .
Next we need to prove thatA can construct e(g, g)ξαr1h2(wi)
for some gξ with an negligible probability, in other words,
A do not have an non-negligible advantage in the SCKA
game. We notice that term r1 can only be found in the term
γ r1, so it requires that ξ should contain γ so as to con-
struct e(g, g)ξαr1h2(wi). Let ξ = ξ ′γ for some ξ ′, then A
just needs to construct e(g, g)ξ
′γαr1 through using term γ r1.
As βr2(αγ − r∗)/β = r2(αγ − r∗), A needs to cancel
r2r
∗ through using terms r∗ and qr(0). However, it is dif-
ficult to construct r2r∗ as above terms can be reconstructed
only when the submitted attribute set matches the specified
access policy T ′. In conclusion, A can break the SCKA
game with a negligible advantage. Therefore, our scheme
is selectively secure against chosen-keyword attack in the
random oracle.
To the best of our knowledge, completely protecting the
security of search token is impossible as A can encrypt a
keyword with his choice. As a result, A can infer whether
keyword ciphertext and search token correspond to the same
keyword set. Assume A has an non-negligible probability
of learning the keyword set from keyword ciphertext and
search token, then the keyword secrecy can be guaranteed.
Theorem 2 Our scheme can gain keyword secrecy in the
random oracle when given the one-way hash functions h2.
Proof We first construct a challenger C who conducts the
following keyword secrecy game.
Setup: C first chooses random elements α, β, γ ∈
Zq, υ ∈ G1, then selects one hash function h2 :
{0, 1}∗ → Zq , finally sets public key pk =
(e, g, gα, gβ, gγ , υ), mk = (α, β, γ ).
C simulates the random oracle Oh1(j) as follows. If
the attribute j has not been queried before, C randomly
selects element rj ∈ Zq , then adds (j, rj ) toOh1 and out-
puts grj . Otherwise, C retrieves rj from Oh1 and outputs
grj .
Phase 1: The adversaryA adaptively issues the following
two oracles for polynomial-time times.
– OKeyGen: C runs algorithm sk ←
KeyGen(mk, S, T ) and sends sk to A, then it adds
T to the list lKeyGen.
– OT rap: C first runs the oracle OKeyGen(T ) to gain
secret key sk = (T , {δy, θy |y ∈ ln(T )}), then calls
T ← Trap(sk,W) algorithm and returns T to A.
Challenge Phase: A first chooses an attribute set S′, then
C selects an access control policy T ′ and computes sk′ ←
KeyGen(mk, S′, T ′). Given attribute set S′ and private
key sk′,A randomly chooses a keyword set W ′ and com-
putes ciphertext C′ and T ′, where S′ should satisfy the
requirements specified in the keyword secrecy game.
Guess: A first outputs a keyword W ′ and sends it
to C, then C computes C′ ← Enc(pk,W,P). If
Search(T ′, I ′) = 1, then A wins the game.
Suppose A has issued τ different keyword sets before
returning W ′, and the probability for A winning the key-
word secrecy game is at most 1|W |−τ + . As the size of
remaining keyword set space is |W| − τ and h2 is one way
hash function, A has a negligible probability  to learn W ′
from h2(W ′). Therefore, the probability of winning the key-
word secrecy game is at most 1|W |−τ +  if it has queried τ
distinct keyword sets, thus m2-ABKS scheme can achieve
keyword secrecy.
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Table 2 Theoretical performance analysis
Algorithms m2-ABKS CP-ABE [7] ABKS-UR [8] CP-ABKS [11]
Setup 3e1 2e1 + p + e2 3ne1 + p + e2 3e1
KeyGen (2n + 2)e1 + nh1 (2n + 2)e1 + nh1 3ne1 + e2 (2n + 2)e1 + nh1
Enc (2l + 3)e1 + mh2 + lh1 (2l + 1)e1 + p + lh1 (3l + 2)e1 + e2 + mh2 (2l + 4)e1 + lh1 + h2
Trap (2n + t + 2)e1 + th2 −− (3n + 1)e1 + h2 (2n + 4)e1 + h2
Search (2n + 2 + t)p + e2 (2n + 1)p + e2 (3n + 1)p + e1 (2n + 3)p + e2
• n: Number of attributes submitted by DU; l: Number of attributes in policy; m: Number of keyword fields; t : Number of interested keyword
submitted by DU
• −−: No this operation
Security of PHR with m2-ABKS Here, we analyze secu-
rity of our scheme in PHR. With regard to encryption for
personal health records, we employ the traditional symmet-
ric encryption algorithm to guarantee records confidentiality
as long as the secret key s is not leaked to unauthorized
DUs. As for the index, its security can be achieved through
established access policy P and random elements r1, r2.
Thus, the adversary cannot deduce corresponding keyword
set even he gains the index, as it is difficult to construct
r2r
∗. While for the search token,A cannot forge legal search
token through collusion attack. In other words, A can com-
promise the confidentiality of PHR data only if he has
legal attribute set, corresponding secret key and symmetric
key.
Performance analysis
In this part, we analyze the performance evaluation of our
scheme in terms of asymptotic computational complexity
(or theoretical performance analysis) and actual perfor-
mance analysis through exploiting the Type A curves within
the Paring Based Cryptography (PBC) library. The exper-
iments are implemented on an Ubuntu 15.04 Server with
Intel Core i5 Processor 2.3 GHz through using C language.
In PBC Library, the Type A is denoted as E(Fq) : y2 =
x3 + x, G1 is a subgroup of E(Fq), and the cyclic group
is a subgroup of E(Fq)2, where q is a large prime num-
ber. The group order of G1 is 160-bit, and the base field
is 512-bit. As for asymptotic computational complexity, we
consider several computational operations, namely, expo-
nentiation operation e1 in G1, exponentiation operation e2
in G2, hash operation h1 which maps a bit-string to an ele-
ment of G1, pairing operation p, and hash operation h2
which maps a bit-string to an element of Zq . Notice that
h2 is much more efficient than other operations. In Table 2
we demonstrate that the computational complexities of m2-
ABKS, CP-ABE [7], CP-ABKS [11] and ABKS-UR [8]
schemes.
In Table 2, we take into account several algorithms, such
as Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Trap and Search. In KeyGen phase,
the computational burden of m2-ABKS, CP-ABE and CP-
ABKS schemes is just slightly less than that of ABKS-UR
due to the additional hash operations nh1 and varies with
increasing n. In Enc phase, the computational overhead of
our scheme is less than that of CP-ABE scheme as it needs
to encrypt multiple keywords in records and attributes in
policy simultaneously, and CP-ABKS scheme is slightly
more efficient than m2-ABKS scheme as it just supports sin-
gle keyword search. While our scheme is still slightly more
efficient than ABKS-UR scheme in spite of additional lh1
hash operations. With respect to Trap algorithm, as the hash
operation h2 is much more efficient than other operations
and the value of t is small, the computational overhead of
m2-ABKS scheme is similar to that of CP-ABKS scheme.
However, our scheme is much more efficient than ABKS-
UR scheme. For the Search algorithm, the computational
burden of m2-ABKS and CP-ABKS schemes are much less
than that of ABKS-UR scheme due to less pairing oper-
ations. Therefore, our scheme is efficient and scalable in
actual applications without bringing in much computational
burden to some extent.
Moreover, we also conduct empirical study over real-
world dataset, namely Enron dataset2, to evaluate the actual
performance of the aforementioned schemes. The dataset
contains half million records from around 150 users and has
been also used in many other works. In line with ABKS-
UR scheme [8], we randomly select 10,000 files from this
dataset and run experiments for 100 times. Let the number
of keyword fields be 1000, we vary the number of attributes
in private key and policy and the number of interested
keywords submitted by DU to test the actual performance
evaluation in Figs. 3 and 4.
Obviously, the computational burden of ABKS-UR
scheme is much heavier than other schemes in Setup algo-
rithm and deteriorates with increasing the value of l. For
convenience, we first set the value of l as 2, then show
the computational overhead occupied by Setup algorithm
among various schemes in Fig. 3. When the value of l
2http://www.cs.cmu.edu/∼enron/
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Fig. 3 Performance comparison in setup algorithm
increases, the computational cost of Setup algorithm in
ABKS-UR scheme dramatically becomes larger yet that
of other schemes remains unchanged as the computational
overhead of m2-ABKS, CP-ABE scheme and CP-ABKS
scheme is not affected by the value of l.
In Fig. 4a we show that the computational cost of private
key generation in KeyGen algorithm varies with the vari-
able n. We notice that CP-ABE, CP-ABKS and m2-ABKS
schemes have the same computational cost (2n + 2)e1 +
nh1, while the computational cost of ABKS-UR scheme is
(3n + 1)e1 + e2. Therefore, ABKS-UR scheme has slightly
larger computational burden than other three schemes with
increasing n.
In Fig. 4b we demonstrate the ciphertext generation time
(encrypting files or building indexes) for 10,000 files with
fixed 1000 keyword fields (m = 1000) in Enc algorithm.
Through varying the value of l from 1 to 100, we notice that
the computational burden of our scheme is similar to that
of CP-ABE and CP-ABKS schemes. Although ABKS-UR
scheme needs (3l+2) exponentiation operations e1, its com-
putational burden is slightly larger than that of other three
schemes owing to lack of lh1 hash operations. Notice that
mh2 can be ignored as the hash operation h2 is much more
efficient than hash operation h1. However, as Enc algorithm
is one-time cost and does not affect user search experi-
ence, its computational cost of is completely acceptable in
practice.
Figure 4c shows that the computational cost of Trap
algorithm in all schemes (except for CP-ABE scheme)
changes with the value of m, while the computational cost
of our scheme is affected by two variables n, t . In CP-ABE
scheme, there exists no trapdoor operation as it cannot sup-
port search queries based on keywords. For comparison, we
set t = 10, and vary n from 1 to 50 to test the actual
performance of Trap algorithm. We notice that the compu-
tational cost of Trap algorithm in m2-ABKS scheme is less
efficient than CP-ABKS scheme. However, both m2-ABKS
and CP-ABKS schemes are superior to ABKS-UR scheme.
Obviously, our scheme brings no additional computational
burden in spite of supporting multi-keyword search. In addi-
tion, the advantages of m2-ABKS and CP-ABKS schemes
are even highlighted as n increases, which justifies with our
theoretical study in Table 2.
The computational cost of Search algorithm is presented
in Fig. 4d. As the computational cost of ciphertext search is
affected by two variables n and t , we set t = 10 and vary n
from 1 to 50 in order to facilitate comparison. As m2-ABKS
scheme mainly needs (2n + 12)p operation, and CP-ABE
scheme (or CP-ABKS scheme) just needs (2n + 1)p (or
(2n + 3)p) operations, CP-ABE and CP-ABKS schemes
outperform m2-ABKS scheme. While our scheme is still
superior to ABKS-UR scheme when the value of n is larger
as ABKS-UR scheme needs (3n + 1)p + e1 operations.
When the value of n is set as 50, our scheme just needs
0.9106s to search encrypted records when t = 10.
From above figures we notice that the actual perfor-
mance evaluation is in complete accord with theoretical
study of computation complexity shown in Table 2. Hence,
our scheme is feasible and scalable in practical applications.
Related work
For simplicity, we roughly divide existing ciphertext
retrieval work into two categories, i.e., key-based access
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control and attribute-based access control. Next, we intro-
duce two typical techniques which enable secure search over
encrypted data, respectively.
Searchable encryption
Due to the heavy data storage and management burden,
more and more individuals and companies are motivated
to outsource storage and management to CSP. To protect
data confidentiality, encryption has emerged as a funda-
mental solution to ensuring data security and privacy. As
encryption seriously obsoletes the traditional private infor-
mation retrieval over plaintext, developing an efficient
and secure information retrieval technique over encrypted
data is of paramount importance. Among the existing SE
schemes [15–22, 24] which provide various securities and
efficiencies, the typical scenario considered is the out-
sourced cloud storage in which there are three entities,
namely data owner (DO), data user (DU) and CSP. DO
first encrypts sensitive data and creates indexes, then out-
sources ciphertext and indexes to CSP. DU needs to generate
a search token for interested keyword and submit it to CSP.
Finally, CSP performs search over ciphertext and returns the
relevant results.
Since Boneh et al. [4] first proposed the public key
encryption with keyword search scheme, many subsequent
SE schemes focusing on single-keyword search [15, 16,
19, 24] or multi-keyword search [17, 18, 20–23] have been
proposed. However, these schemes are only applicable in
single-user scenarios, which are impractical and unscalable
in practice. To tackle above problem, advanced schemes [10,
25] are developed to support multi-user search through
broadcast encryption and proxy re-encryption technologies.
However, traditional SE schemes supporting multi-user set-
ting may complicate the key management as the user revo-
cation requires the updating of keys and ciphertext, which
results in heavy computational burden. Therefore, explor-
ing a fine-grained and effective SE scheme has drawn more
attention in the industry and academic fields.
Attribute-based encryption
Over time, SE scheme has evolved into generalized con-
cept predicate encryption, including various cryptographic
primitives like IBE and ABE. ABE tehnique is considered
as one of most suitable solutions for data access control in
cloud computing, and various schemes [14, 26–28] enriched
with different features have been proposed in the past few
years. In ABE, the private key and ciphertext are asso-
ciated with attribute or access policy, respectively. Only
when the attributes match the specified access policy, the
ciphertext can be decrypted by the DU. Depending on the
policy definition, ABE can be classified into two groups,
Table 3 Functionality comparison in various schemes
Schemes Multi-owner Multi-keyword
CP-ABKS [11]
ABKS-UR [8]
sPHR [9]
m2-ABKS
∗Although the ABKS-UR scheme mentions the multi-keyword func-
tionality, no specific algorithm construction was given
namely key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy
(CP-ABE). The latter is considered to be more suitable for
access control in cloud computing than KP-ABE as it can
specify attributes that DUs need to possess.
The main limitation of SE scheme is that the DO has
to know the identity of DU so as to encrypt data with
the corresponding encryption key, which can be a grand
challenge in multi-user setting. Although ABE can address
this problem through distributing attributes to DU, it can-
not effectively support expressive keyword search due to
its complex attribute and access policy management. To the
best of our knowledge, although the state-of-the-art ABE
with keyword search schemes [8, 11, 29–31] allow DO to
grant keyword search capability to authorized DUs, these
schemes still cannot support multi-keyword search. There-
fore, in this paper we focus on the multi-owner scenario
to support multi-keyword search over encrypted data with
CP-ABE scheme.
Through comparing with other analogous schemes [8,
9, 11], we show the functional advantages of m2-ABKS
scheme in Table 3. Obviously, our scheme can support
multi-keyword search in multi-owner settings. Although the
ABKS-UR [8] has the same functionalities, it does not
give the specific algorithms for generating the trapdoor and
index.
Conclusion
In this paper we propose a multi-keyword search scheme
in a more challenging multi-owner setting. With m2-ABKS
scheme, multiple DOs are allowed to share with their
records with flexible access policy and authorized DUs
are permitted to issue search queries according their corre-
sponding attributes. Additionally, the collusion attacks and
unauthorized accesses can be effectively avoided. Different
from existing schemes, our scheme supports fine-grained
access control and multi-keyword search query in cloud
storage. In particular, formal security analysis proves that
our proposed scheme is selectively secure against chosen-
keyword attack in random oracle. As a further contribution,
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experimental results over a real-world dataset show its prac-
tice and efficiency in practice. As part of our future work,
we need to further enhance the security on a firmer theoret-
ical foundation as well as support more expressive search
queries.
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